IPsec-Protected Transport of HDTV over IP*

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Abstract. Bandwidth-intensive applications compete directly with the operating system's network stack for CPU cycles. This is particularly true when the stack performs security protocols such as IPsec; the additional load of complex cryptographic transforms overwhelms modern CPUs when data rates exceed 100 Mbps. This paper describes a network-processing accelerator which overcomes these bottlenecks by offloading packet processing and cryptographic transforms to an intelligent interface card. The system achieves sustained 1 Gbps host-to-host bandwidth of encrypted IPsec traffic on commodity CPUs and networks. It appears to the application developer as a normal network interface, because the hardware acceleration is transparent to the user. The system is highly programmable and can support a variety of offload functions. A sample application is described, wherein production-quality HDTV is transported over IP at nearly 900 Mbps, fully secured using IPsec with AES encryption.

1 Introduction

As available network bandwidth scales faster than CPU power[1], the overhead of network protocol processing is becoming increasingly dominant. This means that high-bandwidth applications receive diminishing marginal returns from increases in network performance. The problem is greatly compounded when security is added to the protocol stack. For example, the IP security protocol (IPsec) [2] requires complex cryptographic transforms which overwhelm modern CPUs. IPsec benchmarks on current CPUs show maximum throughput of 40-90 Mbps, depending on the encryption used [3]. With 1 Gbps networks now standard and 10 Gbps networks well on their way, the sequential CPU clearly cannot keep up with the load of protocol and security processing. By constrast, application-specific parallel computers such as FPGAs are much better suited to cryptography and other streaming operations. This naturally leads us to consider using dedicated hardware to offload network processing (especially cryptography), so more CPU cycles can be dedicated to the applications which use the data.

This paper describes a prototype of such an offload system, known as "GRIP" (Gigabit-Rate IPsec). The system is a network-processing accelerator card based on Xilinx Virtex FPGAs. GRIP integrates seamlessly into a standard Linux implementation of the TCP/IP/IPsec protocols. It provides full-duplex gigabit-rate acceleration of

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a variety of operations such as AES, 3DES, SHA-1, SHA-512, and application-specific kernels. To the application developer, all acceleration is completely transparent, and GRIP appears as just another network interface. The hardware is very open and programmable, and can offload processing from various levels of the network stack, while still requiring only a single transfer across the PCI bus. This paper focuses primarily on our efforts to offload the complex cryptographic transforms of IPsec, which, when utilized, are the dominant performance bottleneck of the stack.

As a demonstration of the power of hardware offloading, we have successfully transmitted an encrypted stream of live, production-quality HDTV across a commodity IP network. Video is captured in an HDTV frame-grabber at 850 Mbps, packetized and sent AES-encrypted across the network via a GRIP card. A GRIP card on a receiving machine decrypts the incoming stream, and the video frames are displayed on an HDTV monitor. All video processing is done on the GRIP-enabled machines. In other words, the offloading of the cryptographic transforms frees enough CPU time for substantial video processing with no packet loss on ordinary CPUs (1.3 GHz Pentium III).

This paper describes the hardware, device driver and operating system issues for building the GRIP system and HDTV testbed. We analyze the processing bottlenecks in the accelerated system, and propose enhancements to both the hardware and protocol layers to take the system to the next levels of performance (10 Gbps and beyond).

2 GRIP System Architecture

The overall GRIP system is diagrammed in figure 1. It is a combination of an accelerated network interface card, a high-performance device driver, and special interactions with the operating system. The interface card is the SLAAC-1V FPGA coprocessor board [4] combined with a custom Gigabit Ethernet mezzanine card. The card has a total of four FPGAs which are programmed with network processing functions as follows. One device (X0) acts as a dedicated packet mover / PCI interface, while another (GRIP) provides the interface to the Gigabit Ethernet chipset and common offload functions such as IP checksumming. The remaining two devices (X1 and X2) act as independent transmit and receive processing pipelines, and are fully programmable with any acceleration function. For the HDTV demonstration, X1 and X2 are programmed with AES-128 encryption cores.

The GRIP card interfaces with a normal network stack. The device driver indicates its offload capabilities to the stack, based on the modules that are loaded into X1 and X2. For example in the HDTV application, the driver tells the IPsec layer that accelerated AES encryption is available. This causes IPsec to defer the complex cryptographic transforms to the hardware, passing raw IP/IPsec packets down to the driver with all the appropriate header information but no encryption. The GRIP driver looks up security parameters (key, IV, algorithm, etc.) for the corresponding IPsec session, and prefixes these parameters to each packet before handing it off to the hardware. The X0 device fetches the packet across the PCI bus and passes it to the transmit pipeline (X1). X1 analyzes the packet headers and security prefix, encrypting or providing other security services as specified by the driver. The packet, now completed, is sent to the Ethernet interface on the daughter card. The receive pipeline is just the inverse, passing through the



Fig. 1. GRIP system architecture

X2 FPGA for decryption. Bottlenecks in other layers of the stack can also be offloaded with this "deferred processing" approach.

3 GRIP Hardware

3.1 Basic platform

The GRIP hardware platform provides an open, extensible development environment for experimenting with 1 Gbps hardware offload functions. It is based on the SLAAC-1V FPGA board, which was designed for use in a variety of military signal processing applications. SLAAC-1V has three user-programmable Xilinx Virtex 1000 FPGAs (named X0, X1 and X2) connected by separate 72-bit systolic and shared busses. Each FPGA has an estimated 1 million equivalent programmable gates with 32 embedded SRAM banks, and is capable of clock speeds of up to 150 MHz. The FPGAs are connected to 10 independent banks of 1 MB ZBT SRAM, which are independently accessible by the host through passive bus switches. SLAAC-1V also has an on-board flash/SRAM cache for storing FPGA bitstreams, allowing for rapid run-time reconfiguration of the devices. For the GRIP project, we have added a custom 1 Gigabit Ethernet mezzanine card to SLAAC-1V. It has a Vitesse 8840 Media Access Controller (MAC), and a Xilinx Virtex 300 FPGA which interfaces to the X0 chip through a 72-bit connector. The Virtex 300 uses 1 MB of external ZBT-SRAM for packet buffering, and performs common offload functions such as filtering and checksumming.

The GRIP platform defines a standard partitioning for packet processing, as described in section 2. As described, the X0 and GRIP FPGAs provide a static framework that manages basic packet movement, including the MAC and PCI interfaces. The X0 FPGA contains a packet switch for shuttling packets back and forth between the other FPGAs on the card, and uses a 2-bit framing protocol ("start-of-frame" / "end-of-frame") to ensure robust synchronization of the data streams. By default, SLAAC-1V has a high-performance DMA engine for mastering the PCI bus. However, PCI transfers

for a network interface are small compared to those required for the signal processing applications targeted by SLAAC-1V. Therefore for the GRIP system, the DMA engine was tuned with key features needed for high-rate network-oriented traffic, such as dynamic load balancing, 255-deep scatter-gather tables, programmable interrupt mitigation, and support for misaligned transfers.

With this static framework in place, the X1 and X2 FPGAs are free to be programmed with any packet-processing function desired. To interoperate with the static framework, a packet-processing function simply needs to incorporate a common I/O module and adhere to the 2-bit framing protocol. SLAAC-1V's ZBT SRAMs are not required by the GRIP infrastructure, leaving them free to be used by packet-processing modules. Note that this partitioning scheme is not ideal in terms of conserving resources - less than half of the circuit resources in X0 and GRIP are currently used. This scheme was chosen because it provides a clean and easily programmable platform for network research. The basic GRIP hardware platform is further documented in [5].

3.2 X1/X2 IPsec Accelerator Cores

A number of packet-processing cores have been developed on the SLAAC-1V / GRIP platform, including AES (Rijndael), 3DES, SHA-1, SHA-512, SNORT-based traffic analysis, rules-based packet filtering (firewall), and intrusion detection [6,7,8]. For the secure HDTV application, X1 and X2 were loaded with 1 Gb/s AES encryption cores. We chose a space-efficient AES design, which uses a single-stage iterative datapath with inner-round pipelining. The cores support all defined key sizes (128, 192 and 256-bit) and operate in either CBC or counter mode. Because of the non-cyclic nature of counter mode, the counter-mode circuit can maintain maximum throughput for a single stream of data, whereas the CBC-mode circuit requires two interleaved streams for full throughput. For this reason, counter mode was used in the demonstration system.

The AES cores are encapsulated by state machines that read each packet header and any tags prefixed by the device driver, and separate the headers from the payload to be encrypted / decrypted. The details of our AES designs are given in [6]. We present FPGA implementation results for the GRIP system in section 7.

4 Integrating GRIP with the Operating System

The integration of the hardware presented in the section 3 is a fairly complex task because, unlike ordinary network cards or crypto-accelerators, GRIP offers services to three layers of the OSI architecture: the physical, link and network layers. To make a complex matter worse, the IPsec stack - the main focus of current GRIP research - is located in neither the network nor link layers. Rather, it could be described as a link-layer component "wrapped" in the IP stack (figure 2). Thus care must be taken to provide a continuation of services even though parts of higher layers have been offloaded.

For this study we used FreeSWAN, a standard implementation of IPsec for Linux [9]. FreeSWAN consists of two main parts: KLIPS and Pluto. KLIPS (KerneL IP Security) contains the Linux kernel patches that implement the IPsec protocols for encryption and authentication. Pluto negotiates the Security Association (SA) parameters for



Fig. 2. The IPsec (FreeSWAN) stack in the kernel achitecture.

IPsec-protected sockets. Figure 2 illustrates the integration of FreeSWAN into the system architecture. Pluto negotiates new security associations (SA's) using the ISAKMP protocol. When a new SA is negotiated, it is sent to the IPsec stack via the pf_key socket, where it is stored in the Security Association Database (SAD). At this point, the secure channel is open and ready to go. Any time a packet is sent to an IPsec-protected socket, the IPsec transmit function finds the appropriate SA in the database and performs the required cryptographic transforms. After this processing, the packet is handed back to IP which passes it to the physical interface. The receive mode is the inverse but somewhat less complex. When there are recursive IPsec tunnels or multiple IPsec interfaces, the above process can repeat many times.

In order to accommodate GRIP acceleration we made three modifications. First, we modified Pluto so that AES Counter mode is the preferred encryption algorithm for negiotiating new SA's. Second, we altered the actual IPsec stack so that new SA's are communicated to the GRIP device driver using the driver's private space. The driver then caches the security parameters (encryption keys, etc.) on the GRIP card for use by the accelerator circuits. Finally, the IPsec transmit and receive functions were slightly modified to produce proper initialization vectors for AES counter mode. Any packet associated with an AES SA gets processed as usual - IPsec headers inserted, initialization vectors generated, etc. The only difference is that the packet is passed back to the stack without encryption. The GRIP driver recognizes these partially-processed packets and tags them with a special prefix that instructs the card to perform the encryption.

5 Example Application: Encrypted Transport of HDTV over IP

5.1 Background

To demonstrate the performance of the GRIP system, we chose a demanding real-time multimedia application: transport of High Definition Television (HDTV) over IP. Studios and production houses need to transport uncompressed video through various cycles of production, avoiding the artifacts that are an inevitable result of multiple compression cycles. Local transport of uncompressed HDTV between equipment is typically done with the SMPTE-292M standard format for universal exchange [10]. When production facilities are distributed, the SMPTE-292M signal is typically transported

across dedicated fiber connections between sites, but a more economical alternative is desirable. We consider the use of IP networks for this purpose.

5.2 Design and Implementation

In previous work [11] we have implemented a system that delivers HDTV over IP networks. The Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [12] was chosen as the delivery service. RTP provides media framing, timing recovery and loss detection, to compensate for the inherent unreliability of UDP transport. HDTV capture and playout was via DVS HD-station cards [13], which are connected via SMPTE-292M links to an HDTV camera on the transmitter and an HDTV plasma display on the receiver. These cards were inserted into dual-processor Dell PowerEdge 2500 servers with standard Gigabit Ethernet cards and dual PCI busses (to reduce contention with the capture/display cards). Since the GRIP card appears to the system as a standard Ethernet card, it was possible to substitute a GRIP card in place of the normal Ethernet, and run the HDTV application unmodified.

The transmitter captures the video data, fragments it to match the network MTU, and adds RTP protocol headers. The native data rate of the video capture is slightly above that of gigabit Ethernet, so the video capture hardware is programmed to perform color sub-sampling from 10 to 8 bits per component, for a video rate of 850 Mbps. The receiver code takes packets from the network, reassembles video frames, corrects for the effects of network timing jitter, conceals lost packets, and renders the video.

5.3 Performance Requirements

As noted previously, the video data rate (after colour subsampling) is 850 Mbps. Each video frame is 1.8 million octets in size. To fit within the 9000 octet gigabit Ethernet MTU, frames are fragmented into approximately 200 RTP packets for transmission. The high packet rates are such that a naive implementation can saturate the memory bandwidth; accordingly, a key design goal is to avoid data copies. We implement scatter send and receive (implemented using the recvfrom() system call with `MSG_PEEK` to read the RTP header, followed by a second call to recvfrom() to read the data) to eliminate data marshalling overheads. Throughput of the system is limited by the interrupt processing and DMA overheads. We observe a linear increase in throughput as the MTU is increased, and require larger than normal MTU to successfully support the full data rate. It is clear that the system is operating close to the limit, and that adding IPsec encryption will not be feasible without hardware offload.

6 Related Work

Two common commercial implementations of cryptographic acceleration are *VPN gateways* and *crypto-accelerators*. The former approach is limited in that it only provides security between LANs with matching hardware (datalink layer security), not end-to-end (network layer) security. The host-based crypto-accelerator reduces the CPU overhead by offloading cryptography, but overwhelms the PCI bus at high data rates. GRIP

differs from these approaches in that it is a reprogrammable, full system solution, integrating accelerator hardware into the core operation of the TCP/IP network stack.

A number of other efforts have demonstrated the usefulness of dedicated network processing for accelerating protocol processing or distributed algorithms. Examples of these efforts include HARP[14], Typhoon[15], RWCP's GigaE PM project[16], and EMP [17]. These efforts rely on embedded processor(s) which do not have sufficient processing power for full-rate offload of complex operations such as AES, and are primarily primarily focused on unidirectional traffic. Other research efforts have integrated FPGAs onto NICs for specific applications such as routing [18], ATM firewall [19], and distributed FFT [20]. These systems accelerate end applications instead of the network stack, and often lacked the processing power of the GRIP card.

7 Results

7.1 System Performance

The HDTV demonstration system was built with symmetric multiprocessor (SMP) Dell PowerEdge 2500 servers (2x1.3 GHz) and Linux 2.4.18 kernels, as described in section 5.2, substituting a GRIP card in place of the standard Ethernet. The full, 850 Mbps HDTV stream was sent with GRIP-accelerated AES encryption and no compression. In addition, we tested for maximum encrypted bandwidth using iperf [21]. Application and operating system bottlenecks were analyzed by running precision profiling tools for 120 second intervals on both the transmitter and receiver. Transmitter and receiver profiling results are comparable, therefore only the transmitter results are presented for brevity. The profiling results are given in figure 3.

Library/Function	bandwidth	idle	kernel	IPsec	grip driver	appplication	libc
HDTV-SMP	893 Mbps	62%	28%	4%	3%	<1%	< 1%
iperf-SMP	989 Mbps	47%	35%	4%	4%	2%	8%
iperf-UP	989 Mbps	0%	70%	9%	4%	3%	12%

Fig. 3. Transmitter profiling results running the HTDV and iperf applications, showing percentage of CPU time spent in various functions.

The HDTV application achieved full-rate transmission with no packets dropped. Even though the CPU was clearly not overloaded (idle time $> 60\%$!), stress tests such as running other applications showed that the system was at the limits of its capabilities. Comparing the SMP and UP cases under iperf, we can see that the only change (after taking into account the 2X factor of available CPU time under SMP) is the amount of idle time. Yet in essence, the performance of the system was unchanged.

To explain these observations, we consider system memory bandwidth. We measured the peak main memory bandwidth of the test system to be 8 Gbps with standard benchmarking tools. This means that in order to sustain gigabit network traffic, each packet can be transfered at most 8 times to/from main memory. We estimate that standard packet-processing will require three memory copies per packet: from the video driver's buffer to the hdtv application buffer, from the application buffer to the network

stack, and a copy within the stack to allow IPsec headers to be inserted. The large size of the video buffer inhibits effective caching of the first copy and the read-access of the second copy; this means these copies consume 3 Gbps of main memory bandwidth for 1 Gbps network streams. Three more main memory transfers occur in writing the video frame from the capture card to the system buffer, flushing ready-to-transmit packets from the cache, and reading packets from memory to the GRIP card. In all, we estimate that a 1 Gbps network stream consumes 6 Gbps of main memory bandwidth on this system. Considering that other system processes are also executing and consuming bandwidth, and that the random nature of network streams likely reduces memory efficiency from the ideal peak performance, we conclude that main memory is indeed the system bottleneck.

7.2 Evaluating hardware implementations

Results from FPGA circuit implementations are shown in figure 4. As shown in the figure, the static packet-processing infrastructure easily achieves 1 Gbps throughput. Only the AES and SHA cores have low timing margins. Note that there are more than enough resources on SLAAC-1V to combine both AES encryption and a secure hash function at gigabit speeds. Also note that the target technology, the Virtex FPGA family, is five years old; much higher performance could be realized with today's technology.

Design	*CLB Util.*	*BRAM Util*	*Pred. Perf. (MHz / Gbps)*	*Measured Perf. (MHz / Gbps)*
X0	47%	30%	PCI: 35 / 2.24 I/O: 54 / 1.73	33 / 2.11 33 / 1.06
X1 / X2 (AES)	17%	65%	CORE: 90 / 1.06 I/O: 47 / 1.50	90 / 1.06 33 / 1.06
GRIP	35%	43%	41 / 1.33	33 / 1.06
Other modules:				
3DES	31%	0%	77 / 1.57	83 / 1.69
SHA-1	16%	0%	64 / 1.00	75 / 1.14
SHA-512	23%	6%	50 / 0.62	56 / 0.67

Fig. 4. Summary of FPGA performance and utilization on Virtex 1000 FPGAs

8 Conclusions and future work

Network performance is currently doubling every eight months [1]. Modern CPUs, advancing at the relatively sluggish pace of Moore's Law, are fully consumed by full-rate data at modern line speeds, and completely overwhelmed by full-rate cryptography. This disparity between network bandwidth and CPU power will only worsen as these trends continue. In this paper we have proposed an accelerator architecture that attempts to resolve these bottlenecks now and can scale to higher performance in the future. The unique contributions of this work are not the individual processing modules themselves; for example, 1 Gbps AES encryption has been demonstrated by many others. Rather,

we believe the key result is the full system approach to integrating accelerator hardware directly to the network stack itself. The GRIP card is capable of completing packet processing for multiple layers of the stack. This gives a highly efficient coupling to the operating system, with only one pass across the system bus per packet. We have demonstrated this system running at full 1 Gbps line speed with end-to-end encryption on commodity PCs. This provides significant performance improvements over existing implementations of end-to-end IPsec security.

As demonstrated by the HDTV system, this technology is very applicable to signal processing and rich multimedia applications. It could be applied to several new domains of secure applications, such as immersive media (e.g. the collaborative virtual operating room), commercial media distribution, distributed military signal processing, or basic VPNs for high-bandwidth networks.

We would like to investigate other general-purpose offload capabilities on the current platform. A 1 Gbps secure hash core could easily be added to the processing pipelines to give accelerated encryption and authentication simultaneously. More functions could be combined by using the rapid reconfiguration capabilities of SLAAC-1V to switch between a large number of accelerator functions on-demand. Packet sizes obviously make a big difference - larger packets mean less-frequent interrupts. The GRIP system could leverage this by incorporating TCP/IP fragmentation and reassembly, such that PCI bus transfers are larger than what is supported by the physical medium. Finally, several application-specific kernels could be made specifically for accelerating the HDTV system, such as RTP processing and video codecs.

Our results suggest that as we look towards the future and consider ways to scale this technology to multi-gigabit speeds, we must address the limitations of system memory bandwidth. At these speeds, CPU-level caches are of limited use because of the large and random nature of the data streams. While chipset technology improvements help by increasing available bandwidth, performance can also greatly improve by reducing the number of memory copies in the network stack. For a system such as GRIP, three significant improvements are readily available. The first and most beneficial is a direct DMA transfer between the grabber/display card and the GRIP board. The second is the elimination of the extra copy induced by IPsec, by modifying the kernel's network buffer allocation function so that the IPsec headers are accomodated. The third approach is to implement the zero-copy socket interface.

FPGA technology is already capable of multi-gigabit network acceleration. 10-Gbps AES counter mode implementations are straightforward using loop-unrolling [22]. Cyclic transforms such as AES CBC mode and SHA will require more aggressive techniques such as more inner-round pipelining, interleaving of data streams, or even multiple units in parallel. We believe that 10 Gbps end-to-end security is possible with emerging commodity system bus (e.g. PCI Express), CPU, and network technologies, using the offload techniques discussed.

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